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Abstract 
Cash collateral is perfect in that it provides simultaneous counterparty credit risk 
protection and derivatives funding. Securities are imperfect collateral, because of 
collateral segregation or differences in CSA haircuts and repo haircuts. Moreover, the 
collateral rate term structure is not observable in the repo market, for derivatives netting 
sets are perpetual while repo tenors are typically in months. This article synthesizes these 
effects into a derivative financing rate that replaces the risk-free discount rate. A break-
even repo formulae is employed to supply non-observable collateral rates, enabling 
collateral liquidity value adjustment (LVA) to be computed. A linear programming 
problem of maximizing LVA under liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) constraint is 
formulated as a core algorithm of collateral optimization. Numerical examples show that 
LVA could be sizable for long average duration, deep in or out of the money swap 
portfolios.  
 
Keywords: collateral, discounting, liability-side pricing, liquidity value adjustment, 
haircuts, collateral optimization. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
When we speak of securities financing, stocks and bonds come to mind, but never 
options, futures, and other derivatives. Repurchasing (repo) an option? To this date, there 
is no derivatives financing market. On the other hand, private financing of derivatives has 
become an increasingly dominant market trend. By private financing, we mean 
derivatives collateralization by cash or cashable securities that are exchanged for cash in 
                                                 
1 The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author, and do not reflect 
those of his employer and any of its affiliates. An earlier version is titled as “Pricing non-cash collateralized 
derivatives and collateral optimization with liquidity value adjustment”  
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the repo market. Credit support annex (CSA) and central counterparty (CCP) margining 
agreements effectively create a private derivatives financing market, where securities 
collateralized derivative assets can hurl in cash just as Treasury bonds do. 
Such a private market has been on a rapid rise following the post-crisis redesign 
of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, as derivatives collateralization and 
margining become the main counterparty credit risk mitigation tool. It can be either 
bilateral between two counterparties or unimodal when parties clear through a CCP. On 
the CCP clearing front, firms post initial margins to CCP in addition to bi-way variation 
margins. On the bilateral front, new margin rules issued by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives and certain security 
financing transactions have phased in since September 2016. For the remaining out of the 
scope trade population, i.e., uncollateralized derivatives trades with non-covered 
institutions under BCBS-IOSCO, dealer’s hedge with other dealer banks necessitates 
collateral flow. 
As is a private market, its financing rate is not observable. In fact, the derivative 
financing rate we speak of is an artifact for derivative fair value, better known as the 
discount rate. In general, it is expected to deviate away from the risk free discount rate. 
Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) equate a swap under cash collateralization to a portfolio 
of futures contracts, and find empirical evidence that links cost of collateral or costly 
collateral2 to swap rates. The daily MTM results in a stochastic collateral income or 
dividend, which is built as a convenience yield into the discount rate, superseding the 
usual Libor rate, the pre-crisis de facto standard for the risk free discount rate. The surge 
in the Libor OIS spread during the credit crunch of 2007-2008 quickly forged a 
consensus that fully collateralized swaps need to be discounted instead at the overnight 
indexed swap (OIS) curve.  
Johannes and Sundaresan (2007)’s analysis is typical of the early risk neutral, 
reduced form approach that discounts swap cash flow at the risk-free rate conditional on 
                                                 
2 Costly collateral refers to the difference of the interest rate rebated for posted cash collateral from its 
acquisition cost. If the secured party reinvests the cash in Treasury bills and passes back earned interest, 
while the pledging party gets cash from the Fed funds window, there is a net cost as bills have a known 
liquidity premium, therefore having an interest rate lower than the Fed funds rate or GC repo rates. 
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no-default.  Piterbarg (2010) takes a different approach in building the cost of collateral 
into the Black-Scholes-Merton pricing framework. The cash collateralized portion of the 
option MTM could earn a CSA contractual collateral rate, and the remaining 
uncollateralized portion earns the bank’s own unsecured rate. The derivative’s financing 
cost is a weighted sum of the cash collateral rate and the unsecured rate. Piterbarg (2012) 
shows that when the real world measure is changed to a new, equivalent risk neutral 
measure, (fully) collateralized assets return and thus should discount at their collateral 
rates rather than the usual risk-free rate. 
For non-cash collateralized trades, Hull and White (2014) perceives that the 
collateral rate for securities collateral should be the risk neutral expected return, 
irrespective of haircuts. Others, e.g., Brigo, Liu, Pallavicini, and Sloth (2014) and 
Burgard and Kjaer (2013), tend to agree that the repo rate for the securities should be 
used. The excess return of the collateral rate over the risk free rate results in collateral 
valuation adjustment (ColVA). The exact nature and characteristics of the collateral rates 
are not provided, as they are assumed to be exogenously given, presumably by a repo 
financing desk that knows how to determine collateral rates of different collateral asset 
types for the entire duration of the derivatives netting set.  
Note that non-segregated cash collateral is perfect collateral in a sense that it 
provides the same amounts of counterparty credit risk protection and derivatives funding 
simultaneously. Securities are imperfect collateral3 in that the differences in CSA haircuts 
and repo haircuts create mismatched protection and funding amounts. CSA haircuts, e.g., 
5% for 10 year US Treasury notes, are pre-agreed and static. Upon receiving securities, 
the secured party has to turn to the repo market to access cash. Repo haircuts, however, 
are known to be dynamic and procyclic, lower in an expansion cycle and higher in a 
contracting cycle.  
A related issue with imperfect collateral is tenor mismatch. A netting set is 
essentially perpetual, while the repo market, however, is known for its short tenors of 
typically 3 months, rarely one year or beyond. Adding to the complexity is that repo rates 
are intimately related to haircuts and counterparty credit. 
                                                 
3 Fujii and Takahashi (2013) study asymmetric and imperfect collateralization due to CSA’s intricacies, 
unrelated to CSA and repo haircut differences. 
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This article’s main contribution is to take collateral imperfection into account in 
derivatives pricing. The protection and funding mismatches due to CSA and market 
haircut differences are captured in a single derivatives financing or discount rate. This 
results in a neat formulation of the total valuation adjustment, which can be decomposed 
into credit, funding, and collateral adjustments, and a refined liquidity value adjustment 
(LVA). Collateral rates consistent with a newly developed repo pricing methodology are 
supplied, allowing realistic collateral financing costs to be computed via LVA. We also 
explore using LVA as a quantitative measure to aid collateral optimization, a critical 
business process that major financial institutions perform routinely and largely on a 
qualitatively basis. 
 
2. Imperfect Cash Collateral 
 
Cash collateral is only imperfect when segregated, as credit protection is provided 
at the cash amount, but no part of it is used to fund the derivatives. This becomes an 
intermediate case between reused cash collateral that provides both protection and 
funding, and uncollateralized case that offers neither protection nor funding. Unlike 
reused cash collateralized trades, pricing of uncollateralized trades has seen different 
methodologies and debates. At the center is funding valuation adjustment (FVA): the 
dealer bank’s unsecured funding cost or benefit on an uncollateralized (thus unfunded) 
derivative trade. Banks’ FVA models (e.g. Burgard and Kjaer, 2011) could result in fair 
values which depend on the pricing agent’s own funding curve and violate the law of one 
price.  
Hull and White (2014) show that a dealer bank’s funding of an uncollateralized 
asset would incur a debt valuation adjustment (DVA) that offsets its FVA cost to the 
extent that only the dealer’s (liquidity) basis contribution is left. They further propose to 
replace it with an average of dealer banks’ basis (e.g. bond CDS basis) such that the law 
of one price remains intact. Anderson, Duffie and Song (2016) prove that FVA should 
land in the firm’s equity rather than its balance sheet. The fair value is unaffected, 
although traders may incorporate it into bid/ask to recoup value for equity holders. Lou 
(2016a) examines the industry standard FVA setup where an uncollateralized customer 
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trade is hedged back-to-back with another dealer under full bilateral CSA, and points out 
that interest rate risk, e.g., IR01, is not hedged. Correction of the IR01 leakage by means 
of dynamic swap notional leads to the same liability-side pricing formulae of Lou (2015). 
Specifically, the following partial differential equation (PDE) is obtained for V -- 
the fair value of an uncollateralized stock option between parties B and C, 
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where S is the stock price, q stock dividend yield, rb(t) and rc(t) B’s and C’s bond interest 
rates respectively, rs(t) stock’s financing rate, σ volatility. 
The risk neutral pricing formulae under Q-measure for an option with a terminal 
payoff function H(T) is extended via a switching discount rate, 
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The derivatives financing rate re is the liability-side’s unsecured rates. The (total) 
counterparty risk adjustment (CRA), denoted by U as the difference between the risk-free 
derivative price V* and V, is precisely given by, 
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This formulae is interesting for it shows re as both the discount rate -- appearing 
in the exponent, and the financing rate -- appearing in the funding spread applied to V*. A 
decomposition of the spread re–r into a default risk premium and the funding basis leads 
to a coherent form of CVA and FVA, which avoids overlapping DVA and FVA, is 
balance sheet neutral, conforms to the law of one price, and is thus better suited for fair 
value purposes. 
For a partial cash collateral Lt earning interest rate rL, V-L is the uncollateralized 
amount, and the LSP PDE is shown to be 
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With full collateralization, the derivative funding cost in the PDE returns to the 
cash collateral funding rate rL, same as in Piterbarg (2010).  
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It is worth noting that in the derivation leading to PDE (1) and (4), the cash 
collateral is allowed to comingle with the economy, a typical setup for variation margin. 
Smaller end users are allowed to elect to have their collateral segregated, even for 
variation margin. Comingled cash is usable for the economy’s general purposes, and 
economically serves both purposes of credit mitigation and derivatives funding. As a 
special case of imperfect collateral, segregated cash collateral only provides credit 
mitigation but not funding. In the section below, we follow Lou (2015) to extend 
equation (1) for segregated cash collateral. 
 
2.1 Segregated cash collateral PDE 
Consider party B (a hypothetical bank) and party C (a customer) enter into an 
option trade with the bank dynamically hedging the option. Both parties have access to a 
liquid corporate bond market, primary or secondary, exogenous to the simple option 
economy and stock S is financed in the repo or security lending market. When party B 
has a positive exposure to party C (the derivative is a receivable to B), C posts Ls amount 
of cash collateral segregated in a separate account, Ls≤V. Income earned on collateral is 
directly returned to C which B has neither control nor security interest.  At the time of 
C’s default, cash will be released from the segregated account to B to cover any close-out 
payment. 
Prior to a default termination, B has to find a way to finance its derivatives. 
Following Lou (2015), the unsecured amount Wt, W=V- Ls≥0, is financed by the liability-
side. ,

 ttt WWW  

tW  is the cash amount deposited or posted by party C to B that 
pays C’s cash rate rc(t), and 

tW  is by B to C earning B’s cash rate rb(t).  
The wealth equation of a long option economy from party B’s perspective is 
),)(1( stttttttt LSNWVM      (5) 
where 1-Γ is the joint survival indicator, Ls a stock lending account with zero haircut on ∆ 
shares of stock, Ls=∆S. The stock short sale proceed is deposited with the stock lender 
who pays rebate interest at the rate of rs. Mt is the bank account that earns the risk free 
deposit rate r. Nt is B’s debt account that issues short term rolled debt at par rate rN(t), 
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rN(t) ≥r(t). The account could be secured by the remaining asset of the economy and 
could have recourse to the bank.  
Cash flow on the segregated cash account does not enter the economy’s financing 
equation 4 . Pre-default self-financing equation then includes dynamic hedging, stock 
financing, and collateral rebalancing cashflow detailed as follows,  
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At t=0, the wealth reduces to 00000 NWVM  . Since V-W≥0, we set 
M0=π0=0 and N0=L0≥0. This says that the economy borrows a start cash of L0, exactly 
the segregated amount. 
For t>0, keeping the pre-default wealth to 0 leads to st LN  and Mt=0. Now 
suppose that party C defaults at time τ, unwinding the stock financing gets back cash 
amount of ΔS, buying back stock hedges pays cash amount of ΔS, and the segregated cash 
collateral account pays Ls. The unsecured part of V is set-off by the liability-side deposit 
W (Lou 2015).  The net inflow is Ls, exactly same as N, so the debt account can be 
cleared without a loss. There is no jump in cash flow at default and equation (6) is indeed 
the financing equation covering both pre-default and post-default. This is also true when 
party B defaults first.   
Differentiating equation (5) and plugging in equation (6), we obtain,  
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Without loss of generality, write )0)(()0)(()(  uVIuVIur cbN  . Plugging 
into equation (7) and setting πt = 0 result in, 
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Now apply Ito’s lemma, assume delta hedge under the usual geometric Brownian 
motion stock price (dS=µSdt+σSdW), and set dt term to zero, we obtain the following, 
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4 This is obvious when a third party custodian is hired to manage the segregation account. 
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The first five terms are same as the LSP PDE (1). The segregated cash collateral 
enters into the last two terms. The meaning of rates µb and µc becomes clear when we 
consider full cash segregation, Ls=V. Equation (9) becomes 
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Since the debt account Nt amount is fully repaid upon default termination, charge 
rates µb and µc should not contain default risk premium. They reflect bond market 
liquidity and other non-credit, market structural factors (Hull and White 2014), and can 
be referred to as the issuer liquidity rates.  
A firm’s liquidity rate µ might not be directly market observable but can be 
implied from the cash bond market and CDS market via a basis trade. Assuming that C’s 
CDS is cleared through a CCP at a short term par CDS premium x, x is free of 
counterparty risk. Without considering gap risk, the basis trade is not subject to C’s 
default risk, so its no-arbitrage pricing rate has to be rc - x, i.e., µc = rc - x.  rc – x - r is then 
the bond CDS basis (or funding basis). Under zero-recovery assumption, µc=rc - λc, where 
λc is C’s default intensity. 
rb - µb and rc - µc stand for B’s and C’s default risk premiums respectively. The 
sixth term in equation (9) applies when C has to post. Since rc-µc>0, it is a protection 
benefit, or gain due to protection afforded under the segregated collateral account. The 
last term with rb-µb applies when B is posting, reflecting a loss of value due to providing 
protection to counterparty, as compared to nothing provided when uncollateralized. PDE 
(9) satisfies the law of one price5. 
 
2.2 Discount rate representation 
                                                 
5The liquidity rate’s fit for fair value purposes can also be illustrated by a market equilibrium. Suppose that 
the option is an asset to B. B issues a credit linked note (CLN) referencing the option and its segregated 
cash collateral, linked to C’s credit, in the amount of Ls with rd being its price. Because rd directly impact 
derivatives pricing, party C has vested economic interest in rd. If rd is too high, for example, and C finds his 
own funding cost is lower, C would step in to buy the CLN, willing to pay at his own funding rate, thus 
lowering rd. If rd is already low in the market place, C benefits, but B would want to have a claim of that 
benefit, essentially driving up rd back to C’s liquidity rate in the equilibrium. 
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We already know that with comingled full cash collateral providing both credit 
protection and funding, the correct discount rate to use is the risk-free rate. For fully 
uncollateralized trades with neither protection nor funding, the proper discount rate, 
according to Lou (2015), is the liability-side’s senior unsecured rate. Segregated cash 
collateral provides credit protection but not funding, and the appropriate discount rate 
shown in equation (10) is the liability-side’s liquidity rate, i.e., the risk-free rate plus the 
liquidity basis. 
Write the segregated amount in a proportion form for V≠0, 
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The Feynman-Kac formulae would lead to the same expectation formulae as in 
equation (2) with the discount rate re replaced by (11). 
We could introduce a flag χ, 0 meaning segregated, 1 comingled. Since non-
segregated cash returns at rate rL, the effective discount rate for the PDE can be rewritten 
to accommodate both cases. 
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  For party C, its effective rate rec is a linear combination of the unsecured rate rc, 
the liquidity rate µc, and the cash rate rL, each applied to the unsecured (and unfunded) 
portion 1-ηc, secured but unfunded portion (1- χc)ηc, and χcηc the remaining funded 
portion of the fair value V+. reb can be understood similarly. 
In our construct, the only nonlinearity appears in the effective discount rate, 
unlike Brigo et al (2014) where a separate non-linear valuation adjustment is introduced 
in their backward SDE to correct an overlap in value adjustments. Synthesizing into one 
derivative financing rate has its advantages. For example, it is now obvious that party C’s 
zero coupon bond will be priced at C’s senior unsecured rate rc, a model consistency test 
not satisfied by all. Also as demonstrated in Lou (2016a), a Monte Carlo simulation with 
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regression procedure can be developed focusing on the convergence of the finance rate. 
Valuation adjustments correspond to its decomposition and can be computed seamlessly 
thereafter. 
This concept of an effective derivative financing rate in the presence of 
counterparty credit risk and collateral is also evident in Hull and White (2014), where rd 
is shown for various scenarios of collateralization and value adjustments. It is not seen in 
Burgard and Kjaer (2011), although their main result 1 (when the close-out uses risky 
market value) can be easily converted to yield Fccec rrrRr  ))(1(  and 
rrrRr bbeb  ))(1( where R is the recovery rate, rF equals r if the derivative can be 
repo-ed and reb otherwise. Brigo et al (2014) and Anderson, Duffie, and Song (2016) do 
not present such a form. Duffie and Huang (1996) has a similar switching discount rate in 
the swap fair value that equals to the sum of the risk free rate and the CDS spread. Lou 
(2016a) shows that adding a carry cost term can result in the same formulae as eqt. (2).  
 
3. Non-cash Collateral 
 
For non-cash collateral, the CSA normally stipulates that all cash income 
generated from the posted securities will be returned to the posting party. Unlike cash 
collateral which does not incur cost on the secured party, converting securities to cash by 
means of repo involves cost, as the repo rate is higher than the cash rate. Theoretically, 
such a cost could be deducted from the income earned before it gets passed back to the 
pledger. This is however not what the CSA provides for. Collateral repo cost has to be 
incorporated in derivatives pricing. 
 
3.1 Non-cash collateral rehypothecation 
Upon receiving reusable securities from a pledger, the secured party can pledge or 
sell them in a repo transaction to raise cash or rehypothecate in a separate transaction 
with a different derivatives counterparty. The latter is economically the same as if the 
secured party transforms the securities to cash in a repo transaction and subsequently 
pledges the cash to the other party, so we can simply assume that securities are always 
repo-ed out for cash. 
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Suppose party C posts to party B with securities traded at a haircut hp and a repo 
rate rp. At the same time, a haircut hc, not necessarily same as hp, is applied per CSA. Let 
n denote the number of units of securities posted, and Bt the price of posted securities. 
The market value of the securities is nBt. Credit protection under the CSA is then 
L=min(nBt(1-hc),V
+), while the maximum cash equivalency or funded amount Lc = nBt(1-
hp)=L(1-hp)/(1-hc).  
Let’s begin with a special case when hp=hc, then L=Lc. As securities are 
comingled, χ=1. The repo financing rate pr  now replaces the collateral rate rL in equation 
(12) so that the effective discount rate is modified as follows 
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 For full collateralization, we have ηb=ηc=1, then pe rr 
6.  
When hp≠hc, the credit protection amount L and the cash equivalency amount Lc 
do not equal. Consider a full collateralization case L=V: when hp>hc, Lc is less than V, so 
B has deficient fund V- Lc; when hp<hc, Lc>V, party B then has excess fund Lc-V.  
The deficient fund resembles a segregated cash amount as it is protected and bears 
no credit risk, so C’s liquidity rate applies. With an excess fund amount of Lc-V, it is 
debatable whether to include its share of the repo cost. The bank may choose not to 
rehypothecate the portion of collateral that corresponds to the excess fund, thus avoiding 
the cost. Or the bank reuses the excess cash for other purposes, but then it should pay for 
it. It is thus commercially unreasonable to pass through the cost due to the excess 
funding, so the cost basis to be charged through the valuation PDE should be capped at 
V+, i.e., Lc = min(V
+, nBt(1-hp)). 
With partial collateralization, we adopt the same pricing scheme: the deficiency 
fund created by hp>hc can be charged at C’s liquidity rate, and the excess fund created by 
hp<hc is not utilized and not charged of any cost or passed of any benefit. Incorporating 
these considerations, the effective discount rates for party B and C are revised to 
                                                 
6 Our repo rate notation does not distinguish party B from C as repo borrowers. We could write 
)0()0(  VIrVIrr pBpCp , where rpC and rpB denote the repo rates with recourse to C and B 
respectively.  
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In the above, we assume that the pricing of the collateral securities and the 
derivatives can be independently conducted, i.e., there is no wrong way risk. When 
securities other than Treasuries are eligible, CSAs commonly set out eligibility criteria to 
restrict low quality and tangled securities. Under robust front office due diligence, risk 
management monitoring, and control processes implemented, the securities posted do not 
incur specific wrong way risk with regards to the counterparty and the derivatives 
products. The existence of reasonably sized haircuts further weakens general wrong way 
risk (Lou 2016c) to such an extent that it can be safely ignored to the first order. As such, 
there is no need to enlist Bt’s dynamics. 
 
3.2 Initial margin collateral 
The discount rates derived above are for variation margins. Initial margin (IM) is 
different because collateral segregation is mandated in CCPs and under BCBS-IOSCO 
rules. Also non-cash collateral dominates IM posting.  
Trivially, segregated securities do not provide any funding benefit, so Lc=0. CSA 
haircut still applies to the protection amount, i.e., )
)1(
,1min(



V
hnB ct
c . The discount 
rates in equation (14) remain valid by simply letting χ=0. 
There could be a separate issue in that the existing CSA haircut is no longer 
sufficient, comparing to a would-be new CSA haircut. This could happen for instance 
when the eligible securities classes have experienced a worse stress after the CSA was 
signed. The difference can be easily treated as unsecured exposure or the bank can apply 
the new haircut for pricing purposes. (Of course, legally, party C still posts under the 
existing CSA haircut.) For now, we assume that the existing CSA haircuts are sufficient 
to mitigate the credit risk. 
Parties can’t draw any funding benefit from each other’s posted IM collateral. It is 
also impractical to charge one’s IM funding cost in the form of margin value adjustment 
(MVA) over to the other party, unless one is in market making capacity. It is possible 
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however to charge MVA in a non-covered customer trade. Since the dealer has the option 
of posting cash and non-cash, he could price the MVA on the prudent side by assuming 
cash collateral. If such is the case, IM haircuts don’t need to enter fair value calculation.  
 
4. Liquidity Value Adjustment 
 
As the fair value Vt solved from PDE (11) fully incorporates counterparty credit 
risk and derivatives funding cost, it does not need to be adjusted. With regard to the 
(counterparty) risk-free value *tV  which satisfies PDE (11) with re=r, the total valuation 
adjustment (XVA) is trivially the difference of Vt and 
*
tV .  Let U = XVA= V
* - V, then U 
is governed by 
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Noting UT=0, application of Feynman-Kac theorem immediately leads to the 
same XVA formula as in equation (3). This is of course mostly a representation rather 
than an actual solution as the switching rate is coupled with V. Nonetheless, a breakdown 
of XVA can be obtained, for example, LVADFACFADVACVAU  ,  
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4.1 LVA versus ColVA 
The term )())(1( rrr pc    in LVA can be seen as C’s effective 
collateral rate. )( rrp   reflects primarily repo cost and leads to colVA (collateral value 
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adjustment). For a pure receivable to B, V≥0, rb term drops out from equation (16), 
colVA and LVA are 
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))(1( rc    reflects funding cost of the secured but unfunded exposure due to 
CSA haircut being less than the repo haircut. With comingled collateral and hp = hc, 
LVA=colVA.  
Our colVA formulae differs from other definitions such as Burgard and Kjaer 
(2013), 

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    (18) 
where sx is the spread earned on collateral, equivalent to our rL-r for cash collateral or rp-r 
for non-cash collateral, X is the amount of collateral, λB and λC the credit spreads (thus 
containing the liquidity basis) of a zero recovery zero coupon bonds issued by party B 
and C respectively. It is easy to verify that assuming full cash collateral (same amount as 
the risk free fair value V*), equation (18) still involves λB and λC which are not seen in 
Piterbarg (2010) and our results. Our definition of LVA7 is therefore different and a bit 
broader than what has been shown in the literature. 
With deterministic η, these XVA can be computed without recursion. We see 
easily that CRA (CVA+FVA) proportionally goes down as LVA goes up, due to the 
collateralization factor ηc. In the cash collateral case, rp should be replaced by rL. 
LVA as cost can be charged back to customers. The secured party B conducts the 
repo transaction and incurs the cost on C’s behalf. Intuitively, the pledger (party C) could 
do the repo and hand over the cash to party B, without changing the trade economics. By 
taking in cash, party B would price the trade at OIS discount to arrive at a higher price 
V*, implying zero LVA as χ=1, and rp=r in (17). Party C, however, does not gain from 
being paid this higher price as his net economics has to include his repo cost which 
should be the same as B’s LVA. All-in-all, it doesn’t matter whether he hands over the 
                                                 
7  Apart from these differences, we prefer the term LVA to colVA because it better reflects that 
collateralizing derivatives is providing liquidity on the derivatives, i.e., private financing of derivatives. 
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security for B to repo or does the repo himself then hands over the cash, so long as both 
parties access the same repo market. 
Now if the CSA allows both cash and security collateral, party C then holds a 
collateral option. If B prices the trade as if cash collateralized, C could realize an 
arbitrage benefit in the amount of LVA by posting securities instead of cash. Cash 
obviously has zero LVA, while government securities have non-zero, positive LVA. And 
non-government securities are expected to have greater LVA than government securities. 
To avoid collateral liquidity arbitrage, B would have to price the trade by maximizing 
LVA among all possible collateral posting combinations. LVA can be used to measure 
these collateral choices, as will be explored in the next section. 
Similarly, for a pure payable to party B, V≤0, party C’s funding curve drops out 
and LVA will be a benefit. For swap-like hybrids, LVA cost and benefit will coexist, as 
the first and second expressions shown in the last row of equation (16). Liquidity cost or 
benefit may warrant clarification. Suppose B has two identical derivatives liabilities (say 
short call options) dealt with two counterparties C1 and C2. The CSA with C1 allows only 
full cash collateral, while C2 accepts only securities. For the trade with C1, LVA1=0 and 
V1=V*<0. For the trade with C2, LVA2<0, and 0>V2=V*-LVA2>V*. This means that B’s 
liability with C2 is less due to LVA2, so it is a benefit for B. From C2’s point of view, it 
incurs a cost to turn the securities to cash. Counterparty’s cost is B’s own benefit. 
The non-recursive solution (eqt. 17) afforded by a pure asset or liability does not 
exist in general and one has to seek numerical solutions. The Monte Carlo simulation 
with regression approach designed for the switching discount rate in Lou (2016a) can be 
easily extended to cope with the added complexity of fractional and/or non-cash 
collateral.  
Finally, we can derive PDE and XVAs in a similar fashion with the traditional 
riskless close-out. Results are skipped as this is deemed nearly obsolete, as all major 
financial firms have either switched to ISDA 2002 which introduces the risky close-out 
or adopted ISDA 2009 Close-out Protocol if they are still using ISDA 1992 which is the 
source of the traditional riskless close-out. Obviously the market value close-out is closer 
to the ISDA 2002 and ISDA Close-out 2009. 
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4.2 Collateral rate inputs 
Equation (13) depends on the repo rate input. The challenge lies in the 
observability of repo rates and how to supply them when not observable. Even in the 
most liquid Treasuries repo market, quoted repo rates seldom go beyond 3 month tenor. 
Repo tenors extending to 1 year and beyond are not impossible nowadays, especially 
when repos are utilized as a short term investment vehicle (Lou 2016c). But the longest 
maturity of a derivatives netting set can easily exceed 10 years. In fact, netting sets are 
perpetual as new trades get added, until one of the parties desires to terminate the 
relationship or defaults. An analytical model to predict repo rates becomes the only viable 
solution at present time. 
  Treating repo as a debt product and starting from the standard Black-Scholes-
Merton set-up, Lou (2016b) considers repo gap risk during a margin period of risk (MPR) 
and applies an innovative economic capital approach as the gap risk is neither hedgeable 
nor diversifiable. Gap risk pricing introduces two new adjustments, the gap risk economic 
value adjustment (GAP_EVA) for expected gap loss, and capital valuation adjustment 
(KVA) for economic capital charge. A repo break-even rate formulae is derived, 
ElERoErr cp  0       (19) 
where Ec is repo economic capital, RoE return on equity, µ0 cost of fund, El expected gap 
loss, and λ borrower’s hazard rate.  
GAP_EVA relates to λEl, and is very small even under marginal haircuts, 
compared with KVA which relates to cERoE  . At zero haircut, for instance, a one-year 
repo with 10 day MPR on US main equities could command about 50 bp KVA for a 
'BBB' rated borrower. Increased haircut reduces KVA, e.g., to 4 bp at 10% haircut, while 
GAP_EVA is only a fraction of a basis point. Ec depends on repo haircut and borrower’s 
credit quality λ. The former as a model input can be drawn from the tri-party repo market 
where haircuts are relatively stable even during the financial crisis. The latter is 
observable in the secondary debt market and/or CDS market. 
µ0 is near credit risk free assets’ funding rate, e.g., the rate on the remaining 
balance of a loan when its 99.9-percentile value-at-risk is taken out, thus is a measure of 
tail financing or pure funding liquidity. Unlike similar intended issuer liquidity rate, µ0 is 
a broad market measure, not specific to a security but possibly asset class specific. For 
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our purposes, we take the Libor-OIS swap spread curve as a proxy and leave its proper 
identification to future research.  
When forecasting repo rates beyond 1 year, GAP_EVA should remain small and 
can be ignored as the duration of credit risk remains within the MPR in days. KVA 
charge is stable, if λ is flat, as the computation of Ec employs stressed historical data. 
Otherwise, forward λ could be used. µ0 can incorporate Libor-OIS spread curve term 
structure. Once the effective discount rate is determined for the entire duration of the 
netting set, we can proceed to compute LVA and explore collateral optimization. 
  
5. Application in Collateral Optimization 
 
As derivatives collateralization has boomed, reliable and efficient collateral 
management becomes a critical business function. The industry has coined the term 
collateral optimization8 to mean the procedure of finding the right collateral that meets 
each CSA’s collateral eligibility criteria. Roughly, if a CSA allows BBB rated corporate 
bonds, the procedure would exhaust ‘BBB’ rated bond holding before sending out ‘A’ 
rated bonds. Some intuitive haircut arbitrage is included. For example, if party B’s CSA 
sets 5% haircut on US Treasuries while C’s has 0%, it would prefer sending the 
Treasuries to C to B. 
Such strategies recognize that there is value in the form of cheapest delivery 
collateral, apart from more prominent embedded CSA optionality such as currency 
delivery choices and other significant structural asymmetries and imperfection (Fujii and 
Takahashi, 2013). Lacking a quantitative measure, they may not capture collateral cost 
and benefit, which is what LVA is designed for. Below we develop a linearized 
procedure to optimize derivatives collateral management through LVA.  
 
5.1 Single netting set 
When collateral is segregated, repo financing cost does not enter LVA as χ=0 in 
equation (17). A party called upon for collateral can simply post securities with repo 
                                                 
8 Per ISDA (2015) margin survey, 83% of large firms optimize collateral, and most operate systemically on 
a daily basis. 
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haircuts that exceed CSA haircuts by the most. The scope of our collateral optimization is 
therefore limited to comingled securities, i.e., χ=1.  
A particular asset’s LVA per unit can be computed by first assuming that it has 
unlimited quantity such that it could completely fulfill a firm’s CSA posting requirement, 
then normalizing so obtained LVA with the required quantity. Let e denote the LVA per 
unit of security priced at B, 
V
LVAhBe c )1(  . 
Collateral is necessarily posted at the netting set level. For non-cash collateral, 
oftentimes the collateral asset portfolio consists of many different assets. hc, hp and rp in 
equations (14 & 17) are indeed effective CSA haircut, repo haircut, and repo rate. 
Specifically, if m assets are posted under a netting set, each with market value of Ai and 
repo market haircut hpi and repo rate rpi, i=1, 2, …, m, we have the following, 
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where wi is the fraction of the exposure covered by i-th asset, 
L
Ah
w icii
)1( 
 , Spi 
adjusted repo rate, and  1 . 
For a single counterparty, when different securities or classes of securities are 
available, a pecking order can be established in term of the LVA per unit and securities 
would be sent out of the door in that order. 
 
5.2 Multiple netting sets 
The scheme gets more interesting when multiple counterparties are involved, as 
LVA could depend on counterparty’s credit and its netting set characteristics. In the 
simplest case, suppose that party C has identical CSA eligible collateral and associated 
haircuts with a number of dealers and has a netting set of pure payables with each party. 
LVA is then only liability-side (here party C) dependent, per equation (17). C is 
indifferent as to which dealer party to post first. Subsequently, the procedure becomes a 
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haircut arbitrage exercise. In fact, from equation (20), what matters is the adjusted repo 
spread Spi. When repo haircuts are less than or equal to collateral haircuts, securities with 
higher repo rates should be sent out first; otherwise, Spi becomes )(
1
1
rr
h
h
ip
ic
pi



 which 
should be used as the basis to remit securities. This in fact reflects the essence of typical 
optimization procedures. 
For netting sets consisting of swap like hybrid assets (or liabilities), the discount 
rate involves both counterparty’s rates. A security may not have the same utility as each 
netting set’s maturity profile and moneyness are different. Especially considering the 
other party (B) also has a CSA posting option when it becomes the liability-side in some 
future time. C has to make assumptions about what party B might post. Because a 
bilateral CSA is usually symmetric in terms of eligible securities and their haircuts, 
without prior or private knowledge of how B’s collateral pool looks like, the only 
reasonable assumption to make is that B’s collateral pool mirrors C’s. In fact, equation 
(16) has implied such an assumption by using the same   on both LVA cost and benefit. 
Suppose the firm has a collateral pool of M assets and N counterparties with 
bilateral full CSA. Let Bi and Qi denote the market price and holding quantity of i-th 
asset, and Vj the mark-to-market exposure of j-th counterparty. Assuming Vj to be met 
with unlimited quantity of i-th asset, we proceed to find LVA, label it as LVAij and 
normalize it to obtain eij. A collateral posting scheme is an allocation {qij}, where qij is 
the quantity of the i-th collateral asset allocated to the j-th netting set, Qi≥qij≥0, such that 
we maximize the total LVA, 
)max(
, ijji ij
eq  
subject to the following linear inequality constraint and equality constraint: 
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Once the unit LVAs are computed, standard linear programming techniques can 
be employed. A convenience is to always allow one of the assets to be cash with zero 
haircut, price of 1 and arbitrarily large quantity, even if one has sufficient assets to cover 
all demands. The pool to be allocated should consist all non-segregated collateral posted 
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by counterparties. Eligibility criteria, such as rating restriction, concentration and price 
limit etc., have to be run in a separate process. Securities found to be ineligible for j-th 
netting set can be incorporated into the LP scheme by setting the lower and upper bounds 
of qij to zeros. 
A collateral security, if qualified as a high quality liquid asset (HQLA), can also 
be counted towards BASEL III liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). Since this is a regulatory 
requirement, we can build it as an additional constraint. Rewrite the inequality in 
equation (21) in a slack form with nonnegative slack variables si, si≥0, 
HBhs
Qsq
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       (22) 
where H is the required (HQLA) coverage value (product of LCR and the contingent cash 
flow during a 30 day period) and hLi is the applicable LCR haircut for i-th asset.  
Note for netting sets of positive MTM, party C does not post. Collateral pledged 
by other parties, if any and rehypothecatable, can be simply added to the available pool of 
eligible collateral. The same allocation process follows.  
In the above, we have handled full collateralization with non-cash collateral. 
Partial collateralization does exist, although to a much less extent. A non-zero threshold, 
for instance, creates a pocket of fixed uncollateralized exposure, while leaving the rest 
collateralized. The procedure can be a good approximation as the portion of 
uncollateralized exposure does not change much (only to the extent the discount rate is 
effected) while the collateralized portion is being optimized. 
The proposed optimization procedure is a simplification of the complex collateral 
management process that involves both qualitative and quantitative aspects, some of 
which are non-linear in nature. We have in fact linearized the LVA objective function. As 
the system’s dimension is large, considering the number of counterparties and the number 
of collateral securities, some sort of linearization and simplified modeling are necessary 
in order to obtain a practical solution. The advantage of an LP based procedure is its ease 
of incorporating firm specific features through additional constraints, e.g., initial margin 
requirement. The LP problem formulated and the repo rate formulae can still apply when 
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other definitions of LVA or colVA are used instead of our definition, so that it hopefully 
could form a basis for full-fledged collateral optimization procedures. 
 
6. Discussions and Results 
 
To show impact of collateralization, we calculate CRA, LVA and XVA of a 
European at-the-money call option. As shown in Figure 1, at 100% collateralization, 
CRA is zero for both long and short positions. At zero collateralization LVA (as the 
difference between XVA and CRA, not directly shown) is zero so that XVA=CRA. For 
the long call, CRA as the sum of CVA and CFA is the largest at zero collateralization 
(i.e., uncollateralized). As collateralization increases, CRA reduces while LVA increases. 
At full collateralization, CRA is zero and LVA is at its largest. The gap between the long 
XVA and the short XVA becomes the bid and ask spread of this standalone call option. 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparisons of CRA and XVA for a long call option and a short call option, 
S=K=100, vol=50%, T=1 year, r=1%. Party B credit spread to OIS 1.25%, party 
C 3%, collateral rate 1%.  
 
Next, we compute XVA for three sample portfolios of 1000 swaps, randomly 
generated with uniform maturity distribution from 0.25 to 30 years, and swap rates 
around at-the-money rate with 10%, 50% and 90% payer population. Party B’s and C’s 
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credit spreads used are both 125 bp, close to 100 bp collateral repo spread, so total XVA  
decreases rather slowly from uncollateralized (collateralization=0) to full 
collateralization, see Figure 2. LVA increases from zero when collateralization 0 and 
reaches maximum at collateralization 1, while CRA is the reverse, from maximum to 
zero. 
 
 
Figure 2. CRA/LVA/XVA for sample one-sided swap portfolios. Top half shows a 
random portfolio of 10% payer and the bottom half shows 90% payer. 
 
Table 1. XVA decomposition into LVA and CRA (=CVA-DVA+CFA-DFA), for the 
three test swap netting sets when uncollateralized, partially (50%) collateralized 
and fully collateralized. 
  No collateral Half collateral Full collateral 
  90% 50% 10% 90% 50% 10% 90% 50% 10% 
NPV -71.55 1.77 70.04 -72.13 1.80 70.61 -72.72 1.83 71.19 
XVA -6.96 0.37 6.82 -6.38 0.34 6.25 -5.79 0.31 5.67 
LVA 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.75 0.14 2.69 -5.79 0.31 5.67 
CRA -6.96 0.37 6.82 -3.63 0.19 3.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CVA 0.07 0.25 4.55 0.04 0.13 2.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DVA 4.65 0.00 0.07 2.39 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CFA 0.04 0.12 2.37 0.02 0.07 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DFA 2.42 0.00 0.04 1.30 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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As mentioned earlier, CRA can be further decomposed into bilateral CVA and 
FVA. Table 1 below shows the decomposition of swap portfolio XVA into CRA and 
LVA with the former further split into CVA/DVA and FCA/DFA for zero, 50% and 
100% collateralization. All XVAs are expressed in a running spread in basis points. As 
expected, the 90% payer portfolio is dominated by DVA and DFA while the 10% payer 
portfolio is by CVA and CFA. As far as LVA is concerned, for the 90% payer swap 
portfolio (payable), LVA shows a benefit of 5.79 bp, and for the 10% payer swap 
portfolio as a receivable, there is a cost of 5.67 bp. 
CSAs commonly have an option to post cash or Treasuries. Market participants 
typically treat them with the OIS discounting regardless of the haircuts applied to the 
Treasuries. Strictly speaking, there is an LVA involved due to the difference between 
Treasuries repo rates and the Fed funds rate. Post the financial crisis, the 3 month 
Treasuries GCF repo rate has been on average about 10 bp higher than 3 month OIS rate. 
Table 2 shows LVA for the three sample swap portfolios with rL-r=0.1%. The two 
imbalanced portfolios are of about 1.25 bp of LVA. Obviously these will multiply when 
GCF and OIS spread widens. For instance, late October and early November 2016 saw 
the spread at 25 bp. Dealer banks therefore can’t simply ignore the difference for good 
and take for granted to apply OIS discounting to full CSA that allows non-cash collateral. 
 
Table 2. LVA due to OIS and treasuries repo rate differences (10 bp spread) for sample 
interest rate swap portfolios. 
Portf 90% 50% 10% 
npv  -77.26 2.07 75.63 
LVA -1.25 0.07 1.22 
 
 
To demonstrate the use of LVA for derivatives collateral management, we give an 
example of party C having four full CSA netting sets with four different credit quality 
counterparties, hypothetically rated ‘AA’, ‘A’, ‘BBB’, ‘BB’, with 5 year CDS at 125, 
250, 500 and 1000 bp respectively. His collateral pool consists of 6 asset classes, 
including 10 and 30 year US Treasuries, S&P 500 main equities, ‘A’ rated corporate 
bonds with 5 to 10 years of remaining maturity, and ‘AAA’ and ‘AA’ rated commercial 
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mortgage backed securities (CMBS) with 5 to 10 years remaining maturity. Each asset 
class’s available market value is set to 75 fixed.  
Economic capital is calculated with consideration of banks’ credit quality per 
asset class, using historically estimated double exponential jump diffusion process (Lou 
2016c), see Table 3. Sample CSA and repo haircuts are also shown. The cost of fund is 
taken from LIBOR-OIS spread, roughly at 10 bp at the short end (3 month) and about 50 
bp at 30 years.  
 
Table 3. Repo economic capital (%) of selected asset classes for four credits 
hypothetically rated ‘AA’, ‘A’, ‘BBB’, and ‘BB’, under given haircuts. 
\Cpty Rtg AA A BBB BB CSA HC Repo HC 
UST_10y 0.08 0.17 0.4 0.8 0.02 0.03 
UST_30y 1.2 1.7 2.19 2.7 0.04 0.03 
S&P_500 1.61 2.53 3.41 4.28 0.15 0.075 
CMBS_AAA5y 0.32 0.69 1.49 2.41 0.12 0.06 
CMBS_AA5y10 1.15 2.4 3.89 5.5 0.18 0.075 
Corp_A5y10 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.05 
 
The four netting sets are randomly generated interest rate swap portfolios, each 
with 1000 swaps of 90%, 80%, 70%, and 60% payers, and having negative (risk-free) 
mark-to-markets of -118.007, -90.641, -60.98, and -29.915 respectively. To allocate 
collateral, one would need MTM liabilities first but that depend on collateral posted. A 
collateral posting scheme therefore is necessarily iterative. Our scheme starts with the 
OIS discounted MTM, then computes each asset class’s unit LVA per counterparty, e.g., 
as listed in Table 4, assuming C is an ‘A’ rated firm. 
 
Table 4. Unit LVA of each asset per counterparty assuming party C is ‘A’ rated. 
\Cpty Rtg AA-set A-set BBB-set BB-set 
UST_10y 0.0441 0.0439 0.0424 0.0414 
UST_30y 0.0587 0.0584 0.0564 0.0551 
S&P_500 0.0665 0.0660 0.0638 0.0623 
CMBS_AAA5y 0.0492 0.0489 0.0472 0.0460 
CMBS_AA5y10 0.0653 0.0648 0.0625 0.0609 
Corp_A5y10 0.0425 0.0423 0.0409 0.0400 
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Linear programming solver is quite standard. We use Matlab’s linprog function 
for large scale programs. The initial allocation results are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Party C’s initial collateral asset allocation per counterparty’s netting set. 
\Cpty Rtg AA-set A-set BBB-set BB-set 
UST_10y 0 0 0 0 
UST_30y 1.15 68.85 0 0 
S&P_500 70 0 0 0 
CMBS_AAA5y 0 27.9 42.1 0 
CMBS_AA5y10 70 0 0 0 
Corp_A5y10 0 0 26.3 32.87 
 
 Now that we have an allocation, each netting set’s LVA can be recalculated and 
the allocation updated. Table 6 shows the first update of the allocation. Last row shows 
updated MTM for each netting set. Subsequent updates yield little improvement and 
results are omitted here. 
 
Table 6. Updated collateral asset allocation. 
\Cpty Rtg AA-set A-set BBB-set BB-set 
UST_10y 0 0 0 0 
UST_30y 0 70 0 0 
S&P_500 61.37 8.63 0 0 
CMBS_AAA5y 0 12.45 57.55 0 
CMBS_AA5y10 70 0 0 0 
Corp_A5y10 0 0 8.18 31.47 
Updated MTM -109.57 -85.49 -58.10 -28.64 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 Imperfect collateral exists when collateral is segregated or non-cash. We show 
that the effective derivative financing rate is a weighted sum of the bond curve, the 
liquidity rate, and the repo rate with the weights determined as proportions of unsecured 
exposure, secured yet unfunded exposure, and repo funded exposure. The effect of 
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private financing of derivatives via collateralization is generally non-linear as the 
discount rate switches between two counterparties to stay on the liability-side. 
Non-overlapping valuation adjustments are introduced based on a natural 
decomposition of a precisely defined total valuation adjustment. The portion associated 
with the bond curve is counterparty risk adjustment (CRA) which can be further 
decomposed into CVA and FVA, corresponding to the default risk premium and the 
funding basis of the bond credit spread. The portion associated with collateral is defined 
as liquidity value adjustment (LVA) which consists of a part associated with the liquidity 
rate attributed to haircut differences, and another part associated with the securities’ repo 
financing cost defined as collateral value adjustment (colVA).  
LVA thus depends on both repo haircuts and repo rates, providing a theoretical 
construct linking pricing of privately financed derivatives to the securities financing 
market. To address the tenor mismatch between perpetual CSA and repo tenors of a few 
months, the break-even repo formulae is employed to estimate haircut dependent long 
term repo rates. We find that LVA for government security collateralized swap portfolios 
could reach a few basis points. Applying OIS discounting to fully collateralized netting 
sets irrespective of collateral nature therefore warrants discretion. 
 By treating LVA as a quantitative measure of collateral value and computing it 
for each counterparty and every collateral asset, a linear programming problem can be 
formulated to maximize total LVA that could serve as the core of a full-fledged collateral 
optimization procedure. Basel’s leverage coverage ratio and other enterprise features can 
be incorporated as constraints. Numerical examples show that LVA could be sizable for 
long average duration, deep in or out of the money swap portfolios, especially when the 
repo market is in an expansion cycle with low haircuts.  
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